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Sicnarf Hguh's avatar

Hugh, fascinating read, and congratulations on the turnaround! It's interesting to see a studio rethink its operating model so fundamentally. That said, I have some reservations about the conclusions being drawn, particularly whether the new model genuinely improves outcomes for contributors or primarily makes the business more financially resilient.

A few questions I'd be curious to hear your thoughts on:

1. Isn't this fundamentally a transfer of business risk from the company to its contributors?

You describe agencies as banks because they finance payroll, absorb fluctuations in demand, and extend credit to clients. But the new model seems to transfer much of that responsibility to contributors, who now absorb periods of low utilization, unpredictable demand, and delayed client payments. The risk still exist but redistributed.

If the company still controls client contracts, invoicing, and collections, why should contributors bear the consequences of late payments? And how do you determine whether their increased earnings adequately compensate for that additional risk?

What's particularly questionable is your claim that tying compensation to client payments incentivizes better work because “unhappy clients pay slowly.” But payment delays aren't necessarily a reflection of work quality. You yourself acknowledge $1.1M in overdue invoices partly resulting from clients' financial difficulties. If contributors can deliver exceptional work and still be penalized for a client's inability to pay, how is this an effective performance incentive rather than simply a transfer of credit risk? Shouldn't compensation incentivize outcomes contributors can actually control?

2. Is this genuinely collectivism, or a conventional platform model with revenue sharing?

You describe the new structure as “collectivism that embraces capital,” but I'm struggling to see what makes it fundamentally collectivist.

The company retains 33% of every client dollar while significantly reducing its fixed labor obligations. Contributors receive a share of project revenue, but revenue sharing isn't the same as collective ownership or democratic control.

I recognize that you've introduced a worker-ownership pool and quarterly surplus distributions. Those are meaningful distinctions. But the article doesn't establish how much of the company contributors actually own, who receives equity, whether they have voting rights, or who ultimately controls the treasury and strategic decisions.

If contributors are assuming entrepreneurial risk, shouldn't they also receive meaningful entrepreneurial ownership and decision-making power? And what evidence establishes that this is genuinely a redistribution of economic power rather than a more profitable platform model accompanied by a compelling narrative of worker empowerment?

3. How do the historical payroll figures reconcile?

One number I struggled to reconcile was the $500K+ in monthly salary obligations across roughly 30 people. That's approximately $6M annually, or $200K per person in employment costs, yet you mentioned that base salaries were capped at $160k.

Even assuming a 25% employer burden for taxes and benefits, that would imply an average base salary of $160K across the entire workforce, effectively the stated maximum.

Were those monthly obligations inclusive of other expenses, and if not, how do these figures reconcile, particularly given the mix of junior, mid-level, and senior employees?

4. How much of the reported compensation increase reflects genuine raises versus changes in workforce composition?

The individual earnings improvements are impressive, but you also acknowledge that the organization has become substantially more senior-heavy. Removing lower-paid juniors while retaining higher-paid senior contributors would naturally increase average compensation, even without corresponding individual raises.

There's also potential survivorship bias in the satisfaction surveys, particularly if those who preferred the previous arrangement have already left. Could you share the median compensation change for the same cohort before and after the transition, adjusted for hours worked and benefits?

There's another interesting reversal in your compensation philosophy. In How We Set Salaries, garden3d described a transparent, peer-reviewed system specifically designed to reduce bias, unequal bargaining power, and the influence of individual negotiation. Under the new model, contributor compensation is negotiated with Account Leads and Project Leads—the same people who influence access to project opportunities. And what safeguards now prevent favoritism, unequal bargaining power, or discriminatory compensation outcomes?

5. Is the new model sustainable for developing junior talent?

This is something I found particularly interesting when reading your earlier articles.

In your 2021 P&L, you emphasized developing talent internally as a way to improve diversity and career mobility, recognizing that senior hiring pipelines were less diverse than junior ones.

Now you acknowledge that the new model increasingly favors experienced, autonomous contributors and that training and onboarding have become more challenging.

I understand you're developing new training structures, but the financial incentives seem less favorable to investing in people who aren't yet highly productive.

How do you reconcile the new model with your earlier commitment to developing talent internally? And if more studios adopted this approach, who would bear the cost of training the next generation of creative professionals?

6. How much of the crisis was driven by Trump's policies and AI versus longstanding weaknesses in the business model?

You describe Trump's trade policies and AI-driven budget pressures as major contributors to the crisis. I don't doubt that both created genuine uncertainty, but the causal explanation seems incomplete.

You also acknowledge that garden3d had been financially precarious for a decade, that roughly half the design team was unbillable for multiple quarters, and that overdue client invoices reached $1.1M.

Those suggest substantial structural vulnerabilities that predated the immediate market disruption.

AI further complicates the picture: while it may reduce demand for certain services, it can also increase production efficiency, fundamentally changing how creative work is priced and delivered.

What evidence separates the impact of external shocks from longstanding problems with utilization, fixed costs, and client-payment exposure? And if the turnaround primarily came from restructuring those costs, doesn't that suggest the operating model itself was the more fundamental problem?

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From what you've shared, the model has clearly improved the company's financial resilience and created meaningful earning opportunities for some contributors. But it has also transferred more financial risk to individuals, reduced the cost of carrying unbillable capacity, and increasingly concentrated work among experienced talent.

Those may be perfectly rational business decisions. I'm just less convinced that they necessarily represent a more equitable or sustainable model for creative workers as a whole.

If we account for the original workforce, including those who departed, and adjust for compensation, benefits, hours worked, and financial risk, are contributors collectively better off—or is the primary achievement a more profitable and resilient company?

I think that distinction would be particularly valuable for other studios considering a similar transition.

Mercedes Kraus's avatar

After hearing about this anecdotally, it's rad to get to know all of the specifics. I'm very curious to hear — and explore! — how you'll approach the decline in belonging and connection. I know lots of people hungry for this way of working, so thank you for leaving such clear notes along your path. <3

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