Hugh, fascinating read, and congratulations on the turnaround! It's interesting to see a studio rethink its operating model so fundamentally. That said, I have some reservations about the conclusions being drawn, particularly whether the new model genuinely improves outcomes for contributors or primarily makes the business more financially resilient.
A few questions I'd be curious to hear your thoughts on:
1. Isn't this fundamentally a transfer of business risk from the company to its contributors?
You describe agencies as banks because they finance payroll, absorb fluctuations in demand, and extend credit to clients. But the new model seems to transfer much of that responsibility to contributors, who now absorb periods of low utilization, unpredictable demand, and delayed client payments. The risk still exist but redistributed.
If the company still controls client contracts, invoicing, and collections, why should contributors bear the consequences of late payments? And how do you determine whether their increased earnings adequately compensate for that additional risk?
What's particularly questionable is your claim that tying compensation to client payments incentivizes better work because “unhappy clients pay slowly.” But payment delays aren't necessarily a reflection of work quality. You yourself acknowledge $1.1M in overdue invoices partly resulting from clients' financial difficulties. If contributors can deliver exceptional work and still be penalized for a client's inability to pay, how is this an effective performance incentive rather than simply a transfer of credit risk? Shouldn't compensation incentivize outcomes contributors can actually control?
2. Is this genuinely collectivism, or a conventional platform model with revenue sharing?
You describe the new structure as “collectivism that embraces capital,” but I'm struggling to see what makes it fundamentally collectivist.
The company retains 33% of every client dollar while significantly reducing its fixed labor obligations. Contributors receive a share of project revenue, but revenue sharing isn't the same as collective ownership or democratic control.
I recognize that you've introduced a worker-ownership pool and quarterly surplus distributions. Those are meaningful distinctions. But the article doesn't establish how much of the company contributors actually own, who receives equity, whether they have voting rights, or who ultimately controls the treasury and strategic decisions.
If contributors are assuming entrepreneurial risk, shouldn't they also receive meaningful entrepreneurial ownership and decision-making power? And what evidence establishes that this is genuinely a redistribution of economic power rather than a more profitable platform model accompanied by a compelling narrative of worker empowerment?
3. How do the historical payroll figures reconcile?
One number I struggled to reconcile was the $500K+ in monthly salary obligations across roughly 30 people. That's approximately $6M annually, or $200K per person in employment costs, yet you mentioned that base salaries were capped at $160k.
Even assuming a 25% employer burden for taxes and benefits, that would imply an average base salary of $160K across the entire workforce, effectively the stated maximum.
Were those monthly obligations inclusive of other expenses, and if not, how do these figures reconcile, particularly given the mix of junior, mid-level, and senior employees?
4. How much of the reported compensation increase reflects genuine raises versus changes in workforce composition?
The individual earnings improvements are impressive, but you also acknowledge that the organization has become substantially more senior-heavy. Removing lower-paid juniors while retaining higher-paid senior contributors would naturally increase average compensation, even without corresponding individual raises.
There's also potential survivorship bias in the satisfaction surveys, particularly if those who preferred the previous arrangement have already left. Could you share the median compensation change for the same cohort before and after the transition, adjusted for hours worked and benefits?
There's another interesting reversal in your compensation philosophy. In How We Set Salaries, garden3d described a transparent, peer-reviewed system specifically designed to reduce bias, unequal bargaining power, and the influence of individual negotiation. Under the new model, contributor compensation is negotiated with Account Leads and Project Leads—the same people who influence access to project opportunities. And what safeguards now prevent favoritism, unequal bargaining power, or discriminatory compensation outcomes?
5. Is the new model sustainable for developing junior talent?
This is something I found particularly interesting when reading your earlier articles.
In your 2021 P&L, you emphasized developing talent internally as a way to improve diversity and career mobility, recognizing that senior hiring pipelines were less diverse than junior ones.
Now you acknowledge that the new model increasingly favors experienced, autonomous contributors and that training and onboarding have become more challenging.
I understand you're developing new training structures, but the financial incentives seem less favorable to investing in people who aren't yet highly productive.
How do you reconcile the new model with your earlier commitment to developing talent internally? And if more studios adopted this approach, who would bear the cost of training the next generation of creative professionals?
6. How much of the crisis was driven by Trump's policies and AI versus longstanding weaknesses in the business model?
You describe Trump's trade policies and AI-driven budget pressures as major contributors to the crisis. I don't doubt that both created genuine uncertainty, but the causal explanation seems incomplete.
You also acknowledge that garden3d had been financially precarious for a decade, that roughly half the design team was unbillable for multiple quarters, and that overdue client invoices reached $1.1M.
Those suggest substantial structural vulnerabilities that predated the immediate market disruption.
AI further complicates the picture: while it may reduce demand for certain services, it can also increase production efficiency, fundamentally changing how creative work is priced and delivered.
What evidence separates the impact of external shocks from longstanding problems with utilization, fixed costs, and client-payment exposure? And if the turnaround primarily came from restructuring those costs, doesn't that suggest the operating model itself was the more fundamental problem?
/
From what you've shared, the model has clearly improved the company's financial resilience and created meaningful earning opportunities for some contributors. But it has also transferred more financial risk to individuals, reduced the cost of carrying unbillable capacity, and increasingly concentrated work among experienced talent.
Those may be perfectly rational business decisions. I'm just less convinced that they necessarily represent a more equitable or sustainable model for creative workers as a whole.
If we account for the original workforce, including those who departed, and adjust for compensation, benefits, hours worked, and financial risk, are contributors collectively better off—or is the primary achievement a more profitable and resilient company?
I think that distinction would be particularly valuable for other studios considering a similar transition.
Hi Sicnarf! Thank you so much for the detailed read and the meaningful questions. I love engaging in this level of conversation, so thank you!!
1. Is this a transfer of risk to contributors?
Partly yes - it's a bit more complicated than that though. Contributors now carry the same risk of variability as the business. Under a salaried model, employees still absorb that risk, but less in small fluctuations, and more in big bang restructuring (ie, above, when my entire team felt it as a shockwave all at once). To reiterate what I note above, job security doesn't really exist - and salaries in a seasonal business can be seen as "withheld earnings" to smooth out those fluctuations and provide an illusion of job security.
So instead, we share the upside and the downside pro rata, and remove the smoothing. The effect is (IMO) a stronger job security: a traditional layoff is a permanent severing of an employee relationship in a downturn, whereas under our model, we all just take a beat and come back when things pick back up.
To speak to collections specifically - technically, our contract is a "pay when paid" structure with a 90 day outer bound. That means if a client doesn't pay within 90 days, we still will. When our contributors decide to take on a new role, they need to understand the negotiated payment terms and weigh that when they take on the work (big tech often has Net 60+ terms); the choice to take on those terms is entirely their own - sometimes a longer payment term is worth it for the nature of the project itself.
In the cases where a client can't pay for reasons unrelated to their satisfaction, it's in our best interest to ensure our team feel looked after; and in those cases we'll decide internally whether we can afford to advance payment, and whether it's fair to. In the $1.1mm delinquent collections case given above for instance, we'd likely do that (albeit not to the same tune we did - it would have forced us to escalate with the client much earlier).
Not a perfect answer I concede, but the point remains - the pressure of keeping a client happy is now a direct connection to the people primarily responsible for the client's happiness (and not brokered through me, when I get an angry client email about an underperforming team member months too late to course correct the relationship, and trust is already lost).
2. Is this real collectivism, or a platform with revenue sharing?
What I describe herein is a part of our collectivist principles playing out in the design of our revenue attribution model. This post is not about democratic control or collective ownership, albeit we do have both (I've given 80%+ of garden3d's portfolio to our worker ownership pool). At the end of the day though, I do not refer to us as a coop; I see it as more like a law firm partnership model. This is a business with progressive values, and I do largely govern it with the advice and input from our worker ownership team, and the company's input at large.
3. Do the payroll figures reconcile?
The math given above is expedient and simplified to not bury the lede. The $500k+/month figure was our total monthly labor obligation, not base salaries alone (our yearly profit share was additional to that number). It covered payroll taxes and benefits on top of salaries, plus a rotating bench of outside contractors billing at contractor rates. Under this model, we have an entirely different topology of costs, so it's hard to do a true apples to apples comparison.
Individual base salaries themselves were capped at $160k, and our best-paid people averaged around ~$133k in total comp. The point remains - this is a huge jump in "raw take home per hour worked" for the individuals under this agreement.
4. Real raises, or a change in who's left?
Rates aren't privately negotiated. Every project is priced off a public rate card with three tiers (Associate, Technical/Creative Lead, Principal), the revenue-split percentages are the same for everyone, and the maximum take-home per hour at each tier is a published table the whole team can see. Account Leads tasked with winning the work can propose higher rates to the client if they feel they won't lose the business as a result. Account and Project Leads decide which tier a role on a project calls for and staff it accordingly, but pay for that tier follows the published table - so for the most part the splits are transparent and deterministic.
The headline +53% compares the top 6 of the old year with the top earners of the new year. So yes, that isn't a same-cohort comparison. Our new deal never purports to be equally fair for all people - I say plainly that it self selects for the most ambitious people.
Ambitious ICs who don't want to manage client projects directly, but do want to be selected for IC roles need to do stellar work so as to be sought after. It's not a goal of the company to provide roles to anyone here. Our goal is to staff the best people who are available for a given job on each project, and produce the very best work as a result. I wouldn't call that favoritism, I would call it conditions for excellence.
5. Can the model develop junior talent?
Candidly, I do not know; but the talent development problems we have today are bigger than just this model. Developing talent has been a focus of our company for a decade, but our ability to do it well dropped off a cliff when we went remote. We've had numerous attempts at structuring programs for it in the remote environment since 2020, but a lot of the time our new team members had felt like their mentors got busy, forgot to check in, and they'd end up working on the wrong thing in the wrong direction for too long, and course correcting was painful. We'd see our juniors just kinda languish for years without showing much growth.
Our new model simplifies roles and strips back coordination (and thus, coordination headwinds or "meetings about meetings") and focuses on shipping work, so there's even less support for juniors than ever before. In a post-AI world, I'm not sure a remote agency environment can be particularly effective at teaching people who don't yet understand what the computer is doing for them how to be good at directing the computer. It's not likely to make much economic sense for us ever really, but we do continue to see it as a key responsibility as an employer writ large. Today, we have an internal goal to ramp back up on hiring juniors, and we continue to try. That's the best we can do right now!
6. External shocks or a weak business model?
Simply, a weak business model; to be an agency is to be a bank - but I would say the weakest part of our business was that we never did layoffs even in down periods. If we had been more cutthroat, and let people go within ~2 weeks of being on the bench, I'd expect we'd be able to make a salaried model work. But that's just not the type of company I want to run.
Closing: are contributors collectively better off?
I don't think that every type of human is better off at our company, no. I'm careful to say early in recruiting conversations that "this job is not for everyone and that's OK".
Our company rewards ambitious, senior, highly autonomous self starting creatives. Individuals who are more accustomed to managerial structures and having narrowly scoped job definitions aren't likely to thrive at our company. But what I do know is that the people here who transitioned to the new deal and have the necessary social & craft skills to thrive as a Directly Responsible Individual in our workforce are making measurably more money, and are statistically happier than they were in our salaried model.
And yes, I would of course agree that the people who filled out the companywide survey post this transition are far more likely to be happier under the new model - they stayed for it and it worked for them. As a result, we are a happier group percentage-wise. As a leader, you can only make SOME people happy SOME of the time... so that feels like a win to me.
Hugh, appreciate you taking the time to respond. The clarifications help, though I still find a few things difficult to reconcile.
First, there's a pattern in how the story is presented. You clarify that the $500K monthly labor obligation included outside contractors, while half your design team was sitting underutilized on the bench? The headline 53% earnings increase isn't a same-cohort comparison. And what was initially framed around tariffs and AI now appears to have been as much a management problem as an external shock. These aren't minor qualifications. They materially change how readers understand what happened. Why do so many of the strongest claims require substantial qualification once challenged?
You argue the new model offers greater job security, but contributors can receive no work and therefore no income. You say you wouldn't want to run a company that lays people off after two weeks on the bench, yet also say “it's not a goal of the company to provide roles to anyone here.” Haven't you removed the uncomfortable decision of conducting layoffs without necessarily removing the economic insecurity they create?
I'm also struggling with the collectivist framing. Individuals compete for work, Account and Project Leads decide who gets selected, and those who aren't selected go without income. That sounds much closer to a competitive, capital-driven model where the strongest performers thrive and everyone else bears the consequences. Your comparison to a law firm partnership seems particularly telling. There's nothing inherently wrong with that structure, but what exactly makes it collectivist? You mention worker ownership and democratic control, but what actual voting rights and decision-making authority do contributors have?
There's a similar tension around financial risk. You invoke collective responsibility when explaining why contributors should share the downside, but managerial discretion when deciding who receives work and whether payments are advanced early. The 90-day guarantee is meaningful, but contributors still absorb payment delays and income volatility. Why is responsibility collective while authority appears concentrated?
What strikes me is how often the model's stated principles become conditional or discretionary when examined closely. Job security becomes continued access to a network, fairness becomes competition for opportunities, and collective responsibility seems to apply more clearly to financial risk than to decision-making power. You've changed how these trade-offs are distributed, but haven't necessarily resolved them.
That brings me to my broader disagreement with the moral framing. You characterize conventional executives' decisions as “cutthroat,” while presenting your own as more compassionate, even when some of the economic consequences are similar.
You received the moral credit for protecting your team and extending generosity to clients. But when those choices became financially unsustainable, others bore the consequences. Meanwhile, executives who restructure earlier may sacrifice their own popularity precisely because they believe doing so protects the wider organization.
You also acknowledge that the salaried model might have worked had you been willing to restructure earlier. Yet your new model moves some of those difficult decisions into the mechanics of the business, where you no longer have to confront them personally.
I wonder whether there's a difference here between protecting people's livelihoods and protecting your own sense of what a compassionate leader should look like.
Has this experience changed how you view those conventional leadership decisions you previously wanted to avoid?
After hearing about this anecdotally, it's rad to get to know all of the specifics. I'm very curious to hear — and explore! — how you'll approach the decline in belonging and connection. I know lots of people hungry for this way of working, so thank you for leaving such clear notes along your path. <3
Heck yeah, this is exactly the kind of arrangement I want to create and work within. Do you think it is possible to start with a model like this, or do you think the possibility came from already having a core group?
I enjoyed reading this Hugh. Excited for the future of Sanctuary/garden3d. The transparency and setting of expectations has always been consistent at Sanctuary, it’s great to see that soul live on and evolve.
Hugh, fascinating read, and congratulations on the turnaround! It's interesting to see a studio rethink its operating model so fundamentally. That said, I have some reservations about the conclusions being drawn, particularly whether the new model genuinely improves outcomes for contributors or primarily makes the business more financially resilient.
A few questions I'd be curious to hear your thoughts on:
1. Isn't this fundamentally a transfer of business risk from the company to its contributors?
You describe agencies as banks because they finance payroll, absorb fluctuations in demand, and extend credit to clients. But the new model seems to transfer much of that responsibility to contributors, who now absorb periods of low utilization, unpredictable demand, and delayed client payments. The risk still exist but redistributed.
If the company still controls client contracts, invoicing, and collections, why should contributors bear the consequences of late payments? And how do you determine whether their increased earnings adequately compensate for that additional risk?
What's particularly questionable is your claim that tying compensation to client payments incentivizes better work because “unhappy clients pay slowly.” But payment delays aren't necessarily a reflection of work quality. You yourself acknowledge $1.1M in overdue invoices partly resulting from clients' financial difficulties. If contributors can deliver exceptional work and still be penalized for a client's inability to pay, how is this an effective performance incentive rather than simply a transfer of credit risk? Shouldn't compensation incentivize outcomes contributors can actually control?
2. Is this genuinely collectivism, or a conventional platform model with revenue sharing?
You describe the new structure as “collectivism that embraces capital,” but I'm struggling to see what makes it fundamentally collectivist.
The company retains 33% of every client dollar while significantly reducing its fixed labor obligations. Contributors receive a share of project revenue, but revenue sharing isn't the same as collective ownership or democratic control.
I recognize that you've introduced a worker-ownership pool and quarterly surplus distributions. Those are meaningful distinctions. But the article doesn't establish how much of the company contributors actually own, who receives equity, whether they have voting rights, or who ultimately controls the treasury and strategic decisions.
If contributors are assuming entrepreneurial risk, shouldn't they also receive meaningful entrepreneurial ownership and decision-making power? And what evidence establishes that this is genuinely a redistribution of economic power rather than a more profitable platform model accompanied by a compelling narrative of worker empowerment?
3. How do the historical payroll figures reconcile?
One number I struggled to reconcile was the $500K+ in monthly salary obligations across roughly 30 people. That's approximately $6M annually, or $200K per person in employment costs, yet you mentioned that base salaries were capped at $160k.
Even assuming a 25% employer burden for taxes and benefits, that would imply an average base salary of $160K across the entire workforce, effectively the stated maximum.
Were those monthly obligations inclusive of other expenses, and if not, how do these figures reconcile, particularly given the mix of junior, mid-level, and senior employees?
4. How much of the reported compensation increase reflects genuine raises versus changes in workforce composition?
The individual earnings improvements are impressive, but you also acknowledge that the organization has become substantially more senior-heavy. Removing lower-paid juniors while retaining higher-paid senior contributors would naturally increase average compensation, even without corresponding individual raises.
There's also potential survivorship bias in the satisfaction surveys, particularly if those who preferred the previous arrangement have already left. Could you share the median compensation change for the same cohort before and after the transition, adjusted for hours worked and benefits?
There's another interesting reversal in your compensation philosophy. In How We Set Salaries, garden3d described a transparent, peer-reviewed system specifically designed to reduce bias, unequal bargaining power, and the influence of individual negotiation. Under the new model, contributor compensation is negotiated with Account Leads and Project Leads—the same people who influence access to project opportunities. And what safeguards now prevent favoritism, unequal bargaining power, or discriminatory compensation outcomes?
5. Is the new model sustainable for developing junior talent?
This is something I found particularly interesting when reading your earlier articles.
In your 2021 P&L, you emphasized developing talent internally as a way to improve diversity and career mobility, recognizing that senior hiring pipelines were less diverse than junior ones.
Now you acknowledge that the new model increasingly favors experienced, autonomous contributors and that training and onboarding have become more challenging.
I understand you're developing new training structures, but the financial incentives seem less favorable to investing in people who aren't yet highly productive.
How do you reconcile the new model with your earlier commitment to developing talent internally? And if more studios adopted this approach, who would bear the cost of training the next generation of creative professionals?
6. How much of the crisis was driven by Trump's policies and AI versus longstanding weaknesses in the business model?
You describe Trump's trade policies and AI-driven budget pressures as major contributors to the crisis. I don't doubt that both created genuine uncertainty, but the causal explanation seems incomplete.
You also acknowledge that garden3d had been financially precarious for a decade, that roughly half the design team was unbillable for multiple quarters, and that overdue client invoices reached $1.1M.
Those suggest substantial structural vulnerabilities that predated the immediate market disruption.
AI further complicates the picture: while it may reduce demand for certain services, it can also increase production efficiency, fundamentally changing how creative work is priced and delivered.
What evidence separates the impact of external shocks from longstanding problems with utilization, fixed costs, and client-payment exposure? And if the turnaround primarily came from restructuring those costs, doesn't that suggest the operating model itself was the more fundamental problem?
/
From what you've shared, the model has clearly improved the company's financial resilience and created meaningful earning opportunities for some contributors. But it has also transferred more financial risk to individuals, reduced the cost of carrying unbillable capacity, and increasingly concentrated work among experienced talent.
Those may be perfectly rational business decisions. I'm just less convinced that they necessarily represent a more equitable or sustainable model for creative workers as a whole.
If we account for the original workforce, including those who departed, and adjust for compensation, benefits, hours worked, and financial risk, are contributors collectively better off—or is the primary achievement a more profitable and resilient company?
I think that distinction would be particularly valuable for other studios considering a similar transition.
Hi Sicnarf! Thank you so much for the detailed read and the meaningful questions. I love engaging in this level of conversation, so thank you!!
1. Is this a transfer of risk to contributors?
Partly yes - it's a bit more complicated than that though. Contributors now carry the same risk of variability as the business. Under a salaried model, employees still absorb that risk, but less in small fluctuations, and more in big bang restructuring (ie, above, when my entire team felt it as a shockwave all at once). To reiterate what I note above, job security doesn't really exist - and salaries in a seasonal business can be seen as "withheld earnings" to smooth out those fluctuations and provide an illusion of job security.
So instead, we share the upside and the downside pro rata, and remove the smoothing. The effect is (IMO) a stronger job security: a traditional layoff is a permanent severing of an employee relationship in a downturn, whereas under our model, we all just take a beat and come back when things pick back up.
To speak to collections specifically - technically, our contract is a "pay when paid" structure with a 90 day outer bound. That means if a client doesn't pay within 90 days, we still will. When our contributors decide to take on a new role, they need to understand the negotiated payment terms and weigh that when they take on the work (big tech often has Net 60+ terms); the choice to take on those terms is entirely their own - sometimes a longer payment term is worth it for the nature of the project itself.
In the cases where a client can't pay for reasons unrelated to their satisfaction, it's in our best interest to ensure our team feel looked after; and in those cases we'll decide internally whether we can afford to advance payment, and whether it's fair to. In the $1.1mm delinquent collections case given above for instance, we'd likely do that (albeit not to the same tune we did - it would have forced us to escalate with the client much earlier).
Not a perfect answer I concede, but the point remains - the pressure of keeping a client happy is now a direct connection to the people primarily responsible for the client's happiness (and not brokered through me, when I get an angry client email about an underperforming team member months too late to course correct the relationship, and trust is already lost).
2. Is this real collectivism, or a platform with revenue sharing?
What I describe herein is a part of our collectivist principles playing out in the design of our revenue attribution model. This post is not about democratic control or collective ownership, albeit we do have both (I've given 80%+ of garden3d's portfolio to our worker ownership pool). At the end of the day though, I do not refer to us as a coop; I see it as more like a law firm partnership model. This is a business with progressive values, and I do largely govern it with the advice and input from our worker ownership team, and the company's input at large.
3. Do the payroll figures reconcile?
The math given above is expedient and simplified to not bury the lede. The $500k+/month figure was our total monthly labor obligation, not base salaries alone (our yearly profit share was additional to that number). It covered payroll taxes and benefits on top of salaries, plus a rotating bench of outside contractors billing at contractor rates. Under this model, we have an entirely different topology of costs, so it's hard to do a true apples to apples comparison.
Individual base salaries themselves were capped at $160k, and our best-paid people averaged around ~$133k in total comp. The point remains - this is a huge jump in "raw take home per hour worked" for the individuals under this agreement.
4. Real raises, or a change in who's left?
Rates aren't privately negotiated. Every project is priced off a public rate card with three tiers (Associate, Technical/Creative Lead, Principal), the revenue-split percentages are the same for everyone, and the maximum take-home per hour at each tier is a published table the whole team can see. Account Leads tasked with winning the work can propose higher rates to the client if they feel they won't lose the business as a result. Account and Project Leads decide which tier a role on a project calls for and staff it accordingly, but pay for that tier follows the published table - so for the most part the splits are transparent and deterministic.
The headline +53% compares the top 6 of the old year with the top earners of the new year. So yes, that isn't a same-cohort comparison. Our new deal never purports to be equally fair for all people - I say plainly that it self selects for the most ambitious people.
Ambitious ICs who don't want to manage client projects directly, but do want to be selected for IC roles need to do stellar work so as to be sought after. It's not a goal of the company to provide roles to anyone here. Our goal is to staff the best people who are available for a given job on each project, and produce the very best work as a result. I wouldn't call that favoritism, I would call it conditions for excellence.
5. Can the model develop junior talent?
Candidly, I do not know; but the talent development problems we have today are bigger than just this model. Developing talent has been a focus of our company for a decade, but our ability to do it well dropped off a cliff when we went remote. We've had numerous attempts at structuring programs for it in the remote environment since 2020, but a lot of the time our new team members had felt like their mentors got busy, forgot to check in, and they'd end up working on the wrong thing in the wrong direction for too long, and course correcting was painful. We'd see our juniors just kinda languish for years without showing much growth.
Our new model simplifies roles and strips back coordination (and thus, coordination headwinds or "meetings about meetings") and focuses on shipping work, so there's even less support for juniors than ever before. In a post-AI world, I'm not sure a remote agency environment can be particularly effective at teaching people who don't yet understand what the computer is doing for them how to be good at directing the computer. It's not likely to make much economic sense for us ever really, but we do continue to see it as a key responsibility as an employer writ large. Today, we have an internal goal to ramp back up on hiring juniors, and we continue to try. That's the best we can do right now!
6. External shocks or a weak business model?
Simply, a weak business model; to be an agency is to be a bank - but I would say the weakest part of our business was that we never did layoffs even in down periods. If we had been more cutthroat, and let people go within ~2 weeks of being on the bench, I'd expect we'd be able to make a salaried model work. But that's just not the type of company I want to run.
Closing: are contributors collectively better off?
I don't think that every type of human is better off at our company, no. I'm careful to say early in recruiting conversations that "this job is not for everyone and that's OK".
Our company rewards ambitious, senior, highly autonomous self starting creatives. Individuals who are more accustomed to managerial structures and having narrowly scoped job definitions aren't likely to thrive at our company. But what I do know is that the people here who transitioned to the new deal and have the necessary social & craft skills to thrive as a Directly Responsible Individual in our workforce are making measurably more money, and are statistically happier than they were in our salaried model.
And yes, I would of course agree that the people who filled out the companywide survey post this transition are far more likely to be happier under the new model - they stayed for it and it worked for them. As a result, we are a happier group percentage-wise. As a leader, you can only make SOME people happy SOME of the time... so that feels like a win to me.
...THANK YOU AGAIN!
Great answer. Love the detail in both this question and your answer, Hugh.
Hugh, appreciate you taking the time to respond. The clarifications help, though I still find a few things difficult to reconcile.
First, there's a pattern in how the story is presented. You clarify that the $500K monthly labor obligation included outside contractors, while half your design team was sitting underutilized on the bench? The headline 53% earnings increase isn't a same-cohort comparison. And what was initially framed around tariffs and AI now appears to have been as much a management problem as an external shock. These aren't minor qualifications. They materially change how readers understand what happened. Why do so many of the strongest claims require substantial qualification once challenged?
You argue the new model offers greater job security, but contributors can receive no work and therefore no income. You say you wouldn't want to run a company that lays people off after two weeks on the bench, yet also say “it's not a goal of the company to provide roles to anyone here.” Haven't you removed the uncomfortable decision of conducting layoffs without necessarily removing the economic insecurity they create?
I'm also struggling with the collectivist framing. Individuals compete for work, Account and Project Leads decide who gets selected, and those who aren't selected go without income. That sounds much closer to a competitive, capital-driven model where the strongest performers thrive and everyone else bears the consequences. Your comparison to a law firm partnership seems particularly telling. There's nothing inherently wrong with that structure, but what exactly makes it collectivist? You mention worker ownership and democratic control, but what actual voting rights and decision-making authority do contributors have?
There's a similar tension around financial risk. You invoke collective responsibility when explaining why contributors should share the downside, but managerial discretion when deciding who receives work and whether payments are advanced early. The 90-day guarantee is meaningful, but contributors still absorb payment delays and income volatility. Why is responsibility collective while authority appears concentrated?
What strikes me is how often the model's stated principles become conditional or discretionary when examined closely. Job security becomes continued access to a network, fairness becomes competition for opportunities, and collective responsibility seems to apply more clearly to financial risk than to decision-making power. You've changed how these trade-offs are distributed, but haven't necessarily resolved them.
That brings me to my broader disagreement with the moral framing. You characterize conventional executives' decisions as “cutthroat,” while presenting your own as more compassionate, even when some of the economic consequences are similar.
You received the moral credit for protecting your team and extending generosity to clients. But when those choices became financially unsustainable, others bore the consequences. Meanwhile, executives who restructure earlier may sacrifice their own popularity precisely because they believe doing so protects the wider organization.
You also acknowledge that the salaried model might have worked had you been willing to restructure earlier. Yet your new model moves some of those difficult decisions into the mechanics of the business, where you no longer have to confront them personally.
I wonder whether there's a difference here between protecting people's livelihoods and protecting your own sense of what a compassionate leader should look like.
Has this experience changed how you view those conventional leadership decisions you previously wanted to avoid?
After hearing about this anecdotally, it's rad to get to know all of the specifics. I'm very curious to hear — and explore! — how you'll approach the decline in belonging and connection. I know lots of people hungry for this way of working, so thank you for leaving such clear notes along your path. <3
Heck yeah, this is exactly the kind of arrangement I want to create and work within. Do you think it is possible to start with a model like this, or do you think the possibility came from already having a core group?
The core existing group, it seems to me, made this much more possible. The beauty of Hugh's post is in all the shared details.
amazing
Loved reading this
always an inspiration
I enjoyed reading this Hugh. Excited for the future of Sanctuary/garden3d. The transparency and setting of expectations has always been consistent at Sanctuary, it’s great to see that soul live on and evolve.
Adore and appreciate this ambitious strategy and transparency!! Thanks for writing up. Makes me want to be both a client and a contributor 😁
great read, super interesting model. it piqued my curiosity for sure (while i languish in Big Tech ™️).
Thank you so much for this, Hugh! I just wrote a piece inspired by the challenges you experienced. Different approach but same inspiration: https://tedleonhardt.substack.com/p/todays-voluntary-exit-offer